国家科技计划项目立项中的寻租博弈分析  

Rent-seeking Analysis of National S&T Plan Projects Determination Based on Game Theory

作　　者：王欣[1] 贾元华[1] 马晓飞[2] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学交通运输学院,北京100044 [2]中国人民大学经济学院,北京100872

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2011年第8期27-30,共4页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

摘　　要：对国家科技计划项目立项过程中的寻租现象及其产生的原因进行了分析;应用博弈论的分析方法,构建了项目申请者、项目审批部门、国家监督机构之间的三方博弈模型;求出了纳什均衡解,通过对均衡解中各参数变量的进一步分析,给出了寻租活动的治理对策,得出了经费较少的项目容易发生寻租,应重点监督等具有实际意义的结论。This article describes the rent-seeking occurred in the national ST plan projects determination,analyzes its reasons,sets up the game model among project applicants,project approved departments and governments＇ supervisory organizations applying game theory,gets the NE solution,provides the policy implications to control rent-seeking activities through more advanced analysis.In the end,the article draws some conclusions with practical meaning,for example,we should supervise more tightly over the projects supported by less fund because the rent-seeking is more likely.

关 键 词：国家科技计划项目 立项寻租 博弈 

分 类 号：G311[文化科学]