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出 处:《交通运输系统工程与信息》2011年第2期21-26,共6页Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology
摘 要:近年来,随着信息技术和电子商务的飞速发展,物流模式不断变革,物流联盟应运而生.本文从经济学和系统学的角度对物流联盟的形成机理进行了分析.本文在协作博弈模型中引入风险偏好,分析了物流企业风险厌恶程度、联盟协同效应和各种成本系数等因素对物流企业投入和联盟协作的影响.分析表明,物流企业自营成本系数和合作成本系数对物流企业合作意愿影响较大,此外,运营成本和风险厌恶感较低的物流企业有更强的合作意愿,为了激励物流企业的积极性,应给予物流企业以适当的奖励和分成.所以,物流联盟应结合实际情况制定相应的准入制度和恰当的奖励制度.最后,给出一个例子验证了相关结论.In recent years,the rapid development of information technology,electronic commerce and economy has brought about the logistics pattern huge transformation,and the theory of logistics alliance arose at the moment.This paper analyzes the formation mechanism of logistics alliance from the perspectives of economics and systematology.The risk attitude is introduced into the cooperation games,and the influences of enterprise risk aversion,alliance synergy effect and various cost coefficients on the enterprise input and alliance cooperation are studied.The research results indicate that logistics enterprise's willing to cooperate is been impacted greatly by both the self-logistics cost coefficient and the cooperation cost coefficient.In addition,enterprise with lower operating costs and a lower sense of risk aversion is more collaborative.In order to stimulate the enthusiasm of cooperation,appropriate encouragement and profit sharing is necessary,therefore,logistics alliance should develop appropriate access system and appropriate reward system depend on the actual situation.And then we illustrate our findings by a numerical example.
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