群体性突发事件争夺优先行动权的演化情景分析  

Evolutionary Scenario Analysis of Action Priorities for Mass Emergency in the Latent Period Based on Signaling Game

作　　者：刘德海[1,2] 王维国[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济计量分析与预测研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学数学与数量经济学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《公共管理学报》2011年第2期101-108,128,共8页Journal of Public Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(70901016);全国教育科学规划专项研究课题(GLA102084)

摘　　要：针对群体性突发事件潜伏期强势和弱势社会群体争夺优先行动权的冲突问题,构建了固定信号成本和差额比例信号成本的信号博弈模型,提供了一种避免矛盾激化诱发群体性突发事件的冲突协调机制。社会群体是否在冲突的潜伏期通过社会关系网络等发送信号占据优先行动权,取决于发送可信信号的最低临界成本、优先行动获得的额外收益和不同社会群体对于信号成本的评价系数(即承受能力)。根据分离均衡的临界条件,相应地得出群体性突发事件的四种演化情景。结合我国近年来发生的17起群体性突发事件案例,分析了群体性突发事件潜伏期四种演化情景的各自特征和实现演化路径的必要条件。Aim at social conflict problems in the latent period where social advantaged groups and vulnerable groups strive for action priorities,the paper builds up a signal game model considering the fixed signal costs and proportional signal costs respectively,which provides a coordinated mechanism of social conflicts to avoid making situation worse.Whether social groups can send signals for action priorities through social network is determined by the minimum critical costs for sending the believable signals,the extra income derived from action priorities,and the respective evaluation coefficient for signal costs(that is,the bearing ability of social groups).Based on the critical conditions of separate equilibrium,there gets four types of evolutionary scenarios.Lastly,with 17 mass emergencies in China,the paper discusses the characteristics of the four evolutionary scenarios and the necessary conditions of their evolutionary paths in the latent period.

关 键 词：群体性突发事件 信号博弈 演化情景 优先行动权 应急管理 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]