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作 者:周敏[1,2]
机构地区:[1]湖南商学院工商管理学院,长沙410205 [2]中南大学交通运输工程学院,长沙410075
出 处:《湖南商学院学报》2011年第2期85-91,共7页Journal of Hunan Business College
基 金:湖南省教育厅资助科研项目(10C0851)";十一五"国家科技支撑计划项目(2006BAD30B08)
摘 要:针对我国食品产业的发展特点及质量安全要求,认为质量安全是食品产业发展的重要保障。鉴于我国食品产业发展尚不成熟,质量安全较大程度依赖政府的监管制度。结合当前我国实际情况,建立了三种食品质量安全监管制度模式,即处罚制度、奖励制度、问责制度。通过多方博弈分析,得到了各种制度模式下各参与方的效用,推导出可能的博弈均衡形式。研究表明:处罚制度能够在一定程度控制质量安全问题,但容易产生较高管理成本和较低监管效率;奖励制度能有效调动小规模食品生产企业的积极性且管控成本最低,但容易产生政府与食品生产企业的合谋,从而制度失灵;问责制度效果综合了以上两种制度模式的优点,能够实现对食品质量安全的有效把控,具备推广价值。According to the characteristics and quality safety requirements of food industry development,this paper holds that the quality security is the important safeguard for food industrial development in China.Because food industry development is imperfect,quality security mainly depends on government's supervisory system.Through analysis of current actual situation in our country,this paper establishes three quantity security supervisory system patterns for food industry: punishment system,reward system and accountability system.Based on game-analysis in every way,it obtains the effectiveness of each participant in different system patterns and suggests a possible balanced mode.The research indicates that the punishment system can control quality security problem to a certain extent,but it leads to high cost and low efficiency;the reward system can effectively arouse the enthusiasm of small-scale food enterprises with lowest control cost but possible conspiracy between government and food production enterprises,thus leads to system malfunction;accountability system combines the merits of the above mentioned system patterns and should be promoted to realize the goal of food quality security control.
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