两岸履行与完善ECFA的博弈分析  

A Game Theory Analysis of the Execution and Improvement of Cross-strait ECFA

作　　者：邓敏[1] 王敏娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学国际商学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《国际经贸探索》2011年第5期44-49,共6页International Economics and Trade Research

基　　金：西南财经大学"211"工程三期重点学科建设项目

摘　　要：2010年6月29日,两岸签署了《海峡两岸经济合作框架协议》(ECFA),标志着两岸经济关系进入稳定运行的成熟期。但ECFA仅仅是简单的框架,在今后的发展进程中,ECFA能否得到持续有效的履行仍未可知。因此,文章运用博弈论对两岸长期坚持履行ECFA的效应、条件及完善ECFA的路径进行探讨,指出ECFA的后续履行必须坚持两岸对等互惠开放与合作的原则,并提出可以从货物贸易、服务贸易及投资等方向着手,逐步完善ECFA协议。On June 29, 2010, both sides of the cross-strait signed the ＂Economic Cooperative Frame Agreement＂ （ECFA）, which marks the maturity of the cross-strait economic relationship. But ECFA is only a simple framework. Whether ECFA can be sustained effectively in implementation is still unclear in the future. Therefore, this paper uses the game theory to analyze the effect and condition to implement ECFA persistently and the path to perfect ECFA. It suggests that the follow-up performance of ECFA should insist on equal and mutually-beneficial opening-up and cooperation, and that ECFA should be gradually perfected from areas of goods trade, services trade and investment.

关 键 词：ECFA 博弈论 对等互惠开放 

分 类 号：F752.6[经济管理—国际贸易]