政府管制、融资行为与审计治理效应——来自我国上市公司配股融资的经验证据  

Government Regulation,Financing Behavior,and Auditing Governance Effect——Evidence from Chinese Rights Issuers

作　　者：王良成[1] 曹强[2] 廖义刚[3] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学工商管理学院,四川成都610065 [2]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081 [3]江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2011年第5期117-124,共8页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802056;71002043);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC790257;10YJC790161);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2009SCU11095);浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(Y7100206)

摘　　要：基于我国特有的配股管制环境,考察了政府管制对我国审计治理效应的影响。研究发现,审计报告传递的信息有利于上市公司从证监会获得配股资格的管制收益,说明我国的独立审计在公司融资行为的层面上由于政府管制的推动存在着显著的治理效应;政府管制对审计治理效应的推动作用主要通过审计报告传递的信息频率来体现,但在新的配股管制环境下,审计报告被强行管制后信息出现趋同,上市公司出现"自选择"的融资行为,审计的治理效应得到了统一强化。This paper aims to study an unresolved issue whether government regulation plays a positive role in shaping the governance role of external auditors in the emerging and transition economies.Based on the context of Chinese regulation of rights issues,the empirical evidence supports the positive role of government regulation.The results show that it is less likely for the listed firms with modified audit opinions to gain a approval of rights issue from regulators.More specifically,this relation is evident not on the type of qualified audit opinions,but on the frequency of qualified audit opinions.Surprisingly,the relation is no longer evident due to the firm＇s self-selection after the new regulation of rights issue in 2001 took effect.

关 键 词：审计治理效应 政府管制 配股 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]