可耗竭资源开采追加投资行为研究  

Study on Dynamic Behavior of Additional Investment in Exhaustible Resources Extraction

作　　者：葛世龙[1,2] 唐丁祥[3] 周德群[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210046 [2]南京航空航天大学能源软科学研究所,江苏南京210016 [3]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2011年第5期16-20,共5页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(No.08&ZD046);国家自然科学基金(No.70873058,70702015);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目(No.2010SJB790014);上海市科技发展基金软科学研究项目(No.10692102900);南京财经大学科研基金项目资助(No.C0905)

摘　　要：目前,我国可耗竭资源开采回采率普遍较低,企业可以通过追加投资来提高资源的管理及技术水平,进而提高资源开采回采率,减少资源浪费。文中基于Hotelling横向差异化模型,构建了一个三阶段动态博弈模型,采用逆向归纳法的思路,分析了可耗竭资源开采企业追加投资的动态行为。首先在企业通过竞争形成的价格和市场份额给定的基础上,分析第三阶段实行价格歧视消费者的转移情况,得到两企业的竞争策略;接着将第三阶段的最优价格策略和利润考虑到第二阶段中,讨论两企业的价格竞争均衡问题,分别得到两企业的需求;最后将第二阶段的利润贴现到第一阶段,可得到企业追加投资的策略,给出了该动态博弈模型存在唯一子博弈完美纳什均衡的条件和企业最佳追加投资规模。研究结果表明,要使企业追加投资就必须要求追加投资的回报率足够高,当企业追加投资的回报率很高时,只要较小的追加投入就会产生较大的边际成本减少量,获得较大的竞争优势,甚至会将不进行追加投资企业挤出市场;当投资回报率给定时,企业追加投资的激励是取决于其耐心,即企业对未来收益关注越多,则追加投资的规模也越大。Nowadays, the extraction recovety rate of exhaustible resources in China is generally lower than other countries＇. Resources firms can increase the recovery rate and reduce resources wasted by increasing management level and technology level with additional investments. Based on the standard Hotelling model, a three-stage dynamic game model is built to analyze price discrimination and the dynamic additional investment behavior of resources firm by using reverse regression analysis. Firstly, in the third stage, the firms can take price discrimination based on the price and market share obtained at the second stage. Using this information, the competitive strategy is proposed ; in the second stage, two firms compete in price with each other and record the purchase information of consumers. Given the profit and price of the third stage, the paper analyzes the equilibrium of price competition and consumer demand ; and then in the first stage, there is only one firm has additional investment inducing cost-reducing of extraction. The existence conditions of only subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the dynamic game model and optimal additional investment scale of the firm are found. The results show： if the firm can do additional investment, the return on additional investment must be high enough. When the return on additional investment is very high, a small additional investment will have a greater marginal cost reduction, and the firm can obtain more strong competitive advantage. Even the firm without additional investment will be out of the market. When the return on additional investment is given, the incentive of additional investment for the firm depends on the firm＇s patient. That is, the more attention on future profits the firm pays, the bigger scale of additional investment will be.

关 键 词：可耗竭资源 追加投资 价格歧视 动态博弈 最优投资规模 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学] F407