基于社保基金的创业投资双重委托代理研究  

A Study of Venture Capital's Principal-agent Model Based on Social Security Fund

作　　者：曾令华[1] 庞跃华[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学金融与统计学院,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《湖南师范大学社会科学学报》2011年第3期87-90,共4页Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University

摘　　要：基于我国社保基金新开辟的投资渠道,运用博弈论与信息经济学的相关理论,来研究创业投资双重委托代理关系。通过简化模型和定量方法,分析了创业投资家的声誉机制和"六字"方针,其在解决信息不对称环境下双重委托代理的道德风险和激励问题有较好的作用。Based on the social security fund＇s opening up new investment channels,using game theory and the relative information economics theories,we study the dual principal-agent relationship between venture capital.By simplifying the model and quantitative method,we analyze the reputation mechanism for venture capitalists and the＂sixth＂policy which has a good effect based on asymmetric information in solving moral hazard and incentive problems under the dual principal-agent.

关 键 词：社保基金 创业投资 私募股权基金 委托代理 

分 类 号：F832.48[经济管理—金融学]