国际贸易竞争中发展中国家研发补贴效果的博弈分析  

Game analysis of the impact of developing countries' R&D subsidy in the competition of international trade

作　　者：陈欣[1] 晋盛武[1] 王圣芳[1] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学人文经济学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《合肥工业大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第5期766-770,共5页Journal of Hefei University of Technology：Natural Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(09BJL009)

摘　　要：文章研究了发展中国家研发补贴与企业研发能力和市场空间等因素的相互关系,通过企业研发能力对研发补贴的使用程度参数,对企业研发绩效做了一个内生性的拓展,以说明在成本节约的研发活动中,企业将政府研发补贴转化成研发绩效的数量存在差异;并在非合作博弈的基础上,分析两国的一定研发能力下的企业间相互作用和最优研发决策下的发展中国家研发补贴转化成研发绩效的数量。文中提出的新模型提供了一个可处理成本节约型企业研发行为与研发能力、企业对研发补贴的使用和市场空间等参数关系的分析框架。研究表明发展中国家制定研发补贴政策时需要考虑企业研发溢出、研发能力和市场空间情况。This paper analyzes the relation of the developing countries＇ RD subsidy and their enterprises＇ RD capacity to market space.By introducing the usage parameters of RD subsidy decided by the enterprises＇ RD capacity,an endogenous expansion of enterprises＇ RD performance is made to demonstrate the fact that during the innovation for cost economization,there are differences between enterprises in the amount as RD performance is transformed from governmental RD subsidy.Based on the non-cooperative game,the interaction between the enterprises under certain RD capacity in two countries is analyzed as well as the amount of RD performance transformed from RD subsidy using optimal RD policy in developing countries.The developed new model can deal with the relations between cost-economizing enterprises＇ RD activity and capacity,their usage of RD subsidy and market space.The study concludes that when the developing countries make the decision policy of RD subsidy,they should take into account the level of enterprises＇ RD overflow and capacity and their market space.

关 键 词：研发能力 研发补贴 研发绩效 市场空间 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济]