超能力运行下港区内集装箱码头的博弈  

Container terminals game among a port area under overload operation

作　　者：董岗[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《水运工程》2011年第5期91-94,共4页Port & Waterway Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70902074)

摘　　要：以上海外高桥港区集装箱码头为背景,构建超能力运行下同一港区内不同集装箱码头之间的博弈模型,通过逆向归纳法分析求解均衡收费和联盟利润,研究发现:与竞争博弈相比,集装箱码头联盟方都能收取相同并且较高的码头费用,其中部分联盟时联盟方的市场份额均为下降,而非联盟方的均衡收费、市场份额和利润均呈增加趋势。与完全联盟相比,部分联盟时联盟方收取的码头费用、市场份额和联盟利润皆为下降;非联盟方的均衡收费和利润也大幅降低,但市场份额却大幅增加,即同一港区集装箱码头博弈中真正的赢家是非联盟集装箱码头。Combined with the development process and container parameters of Shanghai Waigaoqiao port area,the game model between container terminals among a port area under overload operation is constructed.The equilibrium stevedorage and coalition profit are solved by the backward induction.The results suggest that comparing with the competition game,the container terminal of coalition can charge higher stevedorage,at the same time,the market share of the incomplete coalition container terminal is on the downside,while the equilibrium stevedorage and market share as well as the profit are on the upside.In contrast to the complete coalition,the equilibrium stevedorage and market share as well as profit of the incomplete coalition container terminal are decreasing;the equilibrium stevedorage and profit of the outsider are significantly decreasing,but the market share of it is greatly increasing,i.e.,the real winner is the outsider which earns a better payoff without joining the coalition.

关 键 词：集装箱码头 超能力运行 逆向归纳法 博弈策略 均衡收费 

分 类 号：U169.62[交通运输工程]