主体行为视角下扶贫资金使用效率的进化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on the efficiency of anti-poverty capital from the Perspective of Subject Behavior

作　　者：唐华容[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州财经学院马克思主义学院,贵阳550004

出　　处：《学理论》2011年第15期131-134,共4页Theory Research

基　　金：贵州省软科学基金项目黔科合体R字<2010>LKC2032号

摘　　要：针对扶贫资金使用过程中的低效性,建立了贫困者群体之间以及贫困者群体与政府部门之间的博弈模型及其复制动态方程,并对动态方程作了分析与讨论,得出了博弈模型中各博弈方的进化稳定策略,分析影响扶贫资金使用效率的因素,在此基础上,给出了提高扶贫资金使用效率的合理建议。This paper presents a game model among poverties and a game between poverty and goverment department for the inefficiency of anti-poverty capital.The duplicative dynamic equations of these games are formulated and discussed and the evolutionary stable strategies are inveatigated.Then,the factors of anti-poverty capital are analyzed.Finally,some reasonable advices based on the evolutionary game model are proposed to increase the efficiency of anti-poverty capital in our country.

关 键 词：扶贫资金 进化博弈 复制动态方程 进化稳定策略 

分 类 号：F830.45[经济管理—金融学]