基于妒忌偏好的最优激励契约模型改进及其应用  

The Improvement of Optimal Incentive Contract Model and its Application Based on Envy Preferences

作　　者：刘锦恒[1] 齐俊峰[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学,湖南株洲412007 [2]中国人民银行平凉市中心支行,甘肃平凉744000

出　　处：《经济问题》2011年第6期40-44,共5页On Economic Problems

摘　　要：把妒忌偏好假定为具体的和一般的形式,然后把妒忌偏好导入到单代理人单任务的委托代理模型中,分析其妒忌偏好对参与约束及激励相容约束的影响,并利用分析结论解释了传统委托代理模型不能解释的现实生活现象。The paper assumes the specific and general form of envy preferences. The paper Inserts envy preferences into single - task principal - agent model, then analyzes the effect of envy preferences on the participation constraint and incentive compatibility. Finally the paper explains real - life, phenomenon that the traditional agency model cannot explain the phenomenon based on the analysis conclusion.

关 键 词：委托代理模型改进 忌妒偏好 最优激励契约设计 

分 类 号：F016[经济管理—政治经济学]