中国地方政府官员的隐性激励机制——基于职业生涯考虑模型  

Career Concern: Implicit Incentive Mechanism for Local Official Promotion in China

作　　者：佟健[1] 宋小宁[2] 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学比较经济体制研究中心,辽宁沈阳110036 [2]中山大学管理学院,广东中山510275

出　　处：《当代财经》2011年第6期30-36,共7页Contemporary Finance and Economics

摘　　要：利用职业生涯考虑模型,分析了中国地方政府官员的激励机制。研究发现,地方政府官员在职业生涯的前期会选择努力工作,树立工作能力强的声誉;而在职业生涯的后期,地方政府官员的能力已经被上级政府了解,晋升无望的地方政府官员没有了工作的动力。领导干部终身制会产生激励不足,而官员的任期制解决了地方政府官员努力不足的问题。This paper conducts an analysis of the incentive mechanism for China＇s local officials by making use of the career concern model.The results indicate that the local officials would work hard and build a good reputation in the early periods of their career.While in the later period of their career,the abilities of the local officials are known by the government of higher level,they may lose motivation in their work because of few opportunities for promotion.The life tenure system will certainly result in lacking of motivation;while the system of fixed tenures for the officials can address the problem.

关 键 词：地方政府官员 职业生涯 职业生涯考虑模型 隐性激励机制 干部终身制 

分 类 号：F812.2[经济管理—财政学]