基于信号博弈的阳澄湖大闸蟹绿色标签市场应用分析  

Market Application Analysis of Chinese Mitten Crab Green Label Based on Signaling Game Theory

作　　者：吴昊[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海海洋大学经济管理学院,上海201306

出　　处：《黑龙江农业科学》2011年第6期108-111,共4页Heilongjiang Agricultural Sciences

摘　　要：水产品绿色标签对消费者来说是高质量的信号,对卖家来说则是卖出高价的资本。但是欺诈行为的存在损害了消费者和其他卖家的利益,扰乱了市场秩序。以阳澄湖大闸蟹为例,通过信号博弈理论,对螃蟹市场中买卖双方的消费行为进行博弈分析,得到了精炼贝叶斯Nash均衡。Green label is regarded by consumers as a signal of high quality of aquatic products,and is regarded by vendors as the capital to sell the products at a high price.But the existence of cheat damages the benefit of both consumers and other vendors,and disturbs the market order as well.Taking Chinese Mitten Crab as an example,the consuming behavior of both consumers and vendors in crab market was analyzed by means of signaling game theory,and the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium was obtained.

关 键 词：信号博弈 绿色标签 精炼贝叶斯Nash均衡 阳澄湖大闸蟹 

分 类 号：F326.4[经济管理—产业经济] F224.32