政治关系、金融发展和民营信贷成本歧视  

Political Connections,Financial Development and Discrimination in Bank Loan Cost

作　　者：何靖[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学金融学院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2011年第6期36-45,共10页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学规划项目(10CGJJ03YBQ);浙江省教育厅人文社科项目(Y200907236);浙江省高校人文社科重点研究基地(浙江工商大学金融研究中心)项目(JYTjr20101207)

摘　　要：以中国民营上市公司为样本,分析了政治关系是否有助于民营企业克服其在信贷融资方面受到的成本歧视。研究结果表明,有政治关系的民营企业比无政治关系的企业承担着较低的利息费用和财务费用,而且在金融发展越落后的地区,政治关系的信贷成本效应越显著。这说明,在利率市场化以及民营企业普遍遭受信贷歧视的背景下,政治关系确实能作为金融制度落后的一种替代性的非正式机制,减轻民营企业受到的信贷成本歧视。In this paper,the author takes Chinese private listed enterprises during 2003 to 2009 as the sample and analyzes whether political connections are conductive to private enterprises in terms of decreasing bank loan cost discrimination.The findings are that enterprises with political connections pay lower cost in bank loans than those without political connections,and that the more backward the financial development in a region is,the more noticeable the effect of this kind of loan cost there is.The results of this study indicate that,in the present China with interest rate marketization and bank discrimination,the political connections can be served as an informal substitute mechanism to help private enterprises lessen the discrimination in bank loan cost.

关 键 词：政治关系 信贷成本歧视 民营上市公司 

分 类 号：F832[经济管理—金融学]