非对称信息下铁路重载集疏运一体化利益分配博弈  

Game analysis of profit distribution of railway heavy-haul cargo distribution and transportation system with asymmetric information

作　　者：冯芬玲[1] 蓝丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学交通运输工程学院,湖南长沙410075

出　　处：《中南大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第5期1473-1481,共9页Journal of Central South University:Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(2010QZZD021);铁道部科技研究开发计划项目(2010X014;2008X020-B)

摘　　要：分析非对称信息下集疏运利益分配的原则及要素,在此基础上建立利益分配模型,采用多阶段博弈进行求解。采用Shapley值法的最小距离解对模型求解过程进行修正。研究结果表明:在集疏运中,创新所承担的风险越大,利益分配比例越低;工作贡献系数越大,利益分配比例越高;基于协商让利的原则,使得风险相对均摊,保护小企业和有潜力的合作企业;模型能较好地解决非对称信息下集疏运的利益分配问题,验证了模型的合理性和适用性。The principles and elements of distributing interests produced in the process of cargo distribution and transportation under asymmetric information were analyzed, the profit distribution arrangement was modeled on the basis of such analysis, and the solution was obtained through gaming in multiple stages. The model was fixed by means of minimum distance solution achieved through Shapely value method based on the principle of profit sharing through consultation. The results show that the more the risk bearing in the innovation of cargo distribution and transportation, the less the profit; the more the contribution to the program, the more the profit. The risk will be shared equally and small enterprises as well as potential cooperative enterprises will be protected. Profit distribution of cargo distribution and transportation with asymmetric information can be well handled in this model, thus verifying the rationality and applicability of the model.

关 键 词：铁路 重载运输 集疏运一体化 利益分配 博弈分析 

分 类 号：U294.1[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]