从业绩预告违规看中国证券监管的处罚效果  

On the Regulatory Effects of the Chinese Securities Regulation in View of the Management Forecasts Frauds

作　　者：宋云玲[1] 李志文[2] 纪新伟[3] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学,浙江杭州310058 [2]清华大学,北京100084 [3]南开大学,天津300071

出　　处：《金融研究》2011年第6期136-149,共14页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金项目(编号:20100481409)的资助

摘　　要：依托中国特殊的强制性业绩预告制度,考察证券监管的处罚行为能否显著降低上市公司发生业绩预告违规的概率。基于2002～2008年年报业绩预告的大样本检验表明,与业绩预告违规有关的处罚或与其他违规有关的处罚都没有发挥降低后续业绩预告违规概率的作用,监管处罚的效果并不理想。Management earnings forecasts in China are mandatory. This provides us with an opportunity to test whether the probabilities of management forecaats frauds are significantly reduced by prior enforcement actions. Large sample test from 2002 to 2008 indicated that the enforcement actions induced by management forecasts frauds or other frauds didn＇t curb the probability of subsequent management forecasts frauds. That is, the regulatory effects are weak.

关 键 词：处罚效果 业绩预告 违规 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]