农村小额团体贷款防合谋机制设计  

Collusion-proof mechanism designing for rural micro-group-lending

作　　者：孟卫东[1] 周苹逢[1] 江丽梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《科研管理》2011年第6期124-132,共9页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目(编号:08AJY028;起止时间:2010-2012)

摘　　要：在信息不对称条件下,运用机制设计理论设计了个人贷款契约与团体贷款防合谋契约,并研究了村庄成员结构与项目收益对小额信贷机构决策的影响。研究表明,小额信贷机构为规避逆向选择与道德风险,基于匹配效应设计的团体贷款防合谋契约与个人贷款契约相比,能抽取更多的租金且适用范围更广;当村庄成员结构与项目收益使小额信贷机构期望收益不小于0时,小额信贷机构才愿意提供贷款契约,而在资金有限的情况下,还需比较小额信贷机构在各村庄中的期望收益最大值。Using the mechanism design theory,individual loan contracts and collusion-proof group lending contracts with asymmetric information are designed,and the effect of structure of the social members in the village and project revenue on MFIs＇ decisions is studied.The results show that individual contracts and collusion-proof group contracts designed by MFIs can avoid adverse selection and moral hazard.Compared with the individual contracts,collusion-proof group contracts which are designed based on assortative matching effect are suitable for more villages and can extract more rents.Only if the structure of the social members in village and project revenue could make MFIs＇ maximum expected payoff no less than zero,then the MFIs are ready to provide collusion-proof group contracts;while with the limited capital,the MFIs still needs to rank their maximum expected payoff in different villages.

关 键 词：信息不对称 匹配效应 个人贷款 团体贷款 合谋 

分 类 号：F832.43[经济管理—金融学]