投资机会、审计风险与审计质量研究  

A Research on Investment Opportunities,Audit Risk and Auditing Quality

作　　者：翟华云[1] 廖洪[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南民族大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2011年第4期46-53,共8页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC630231);中南民族大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目(CSQ11002)

摘　　要：审计可以被视为解决公司代理问题的一种监控机制,是一项能够约束管理者机会主义行为的制度安排。以我国2004年—2008年只发行A股的上市公司为研究样本,在控制样本自选择偏误的基础上,检验审计质量、投资机会和可操控性应计的关系后发现:高投资机会公司的股东为监督公司的管理者有动机选择高质量的审计;同时,投资机会越大的公司,其可操控性应计越高,即高投资机会公司的注册会计师面临着更高的审计风险;而注册会计师为了降低审计风险和被诉讼的风险,也有动机提高自身的审计质量,从而遏制被审单位的可操控性应计。Auditing is a bonding device of the managers that they will not behave opportunistically.Using the data of China＇s listed companies of A share during the period of 2004-2008,this paper examines the relationship between auditing quality,investment opportunities and level of discretionary accruals based on the controlling self-selection bias.It is found that shareholders have an incentive selection of high quality audit in order to supervise managers in the company of high investment opportunities.In addition,the greater the investment opportunities of companies is,the higher discretionary accruals can be,That is,the CPA is facing a higher risk in the company of high investment opportunities.In order to reduce audit risk and litigation risk,the CPAs also have an incentive to improve their quality audit,thus preventing the discretionary accruals of the audited company.

关 键 词：投资机会 审计风险 审计质量 可操控性应计 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]