信息不对称环境下企业行为与环境规制的有效性探析  

Firm Action and the Effectiveness of Environmental Regulation from the Perspective of Information Asymmetry

作　　者：黄民礼[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山火炬职业技术学院现代服务管理系,广东中山528436

出　　处：《湖南工程学院学报（社会科学版）》2011年第2期21-26,共6页Journal of Hunan Institute of Engineering(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：信息不对称在环境规制过程中普遍存在。分析发现:信息不对称环境下,污染企业都有率先不进行污染治理的环境机会主义动机,若治理成本在可承受范围内,污染企业环境治理决策与信息不对称产生的机会主义空间大小关系更为密切;规制者依据污染企业的机会主义动机程度进行分层管理和相应提高环境违规成本,对提高环境规制的有效性具有重要启示。Information asymmetry exists widely in the process of environmental regulation.Fiudings show that under the circumstance of information asymmetry,polluting firms always have environmental opportunism motivation not to abate pollution,and if abatement cost is bearable,firm＇s decisions will have stronger relationship with the opportunism space created by information asymmetry.What is more,Regulators should execute layer-management on the basis of different levels of environmental opportunism and raise environmental violation punishment accordingly.Such actions will be helpful to the effectiveness of environmental regulation.

关 键 词：环境规制 信息不对称 企业行为 环境机会主义 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]