基于指派博弈的房地产市场运行机制研究  

Operation Mechanism of Real Estate Market Based on Assignment Game

作　　者：黄武军[1] 杨继君[2] 吴启迪[1] 

机构地区：[1]同济大学经济与管理学院 [2]中共广西区委党校公共管理教研部

出　　处：《管理学报》2011年第7期1093-1096,1101,共5页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871091;70640007)

摘　　要：针对目前房地产市场的特点,以博弈论为工具分析了房地产市场参与主体的行为。首先,建立基于政府、开发商和消费者三方指派博弈模型,对三方指派博弈的核心可能为空的情况,提出了改进的核心法,并在此基础上给出了补偿金制度的设想。随后,建立仅针对开发商和消费者的二方指派博弈模型,并与三方指派博弈模型进行对比分析,论证了政府不直接参与房地产市场交易而由市场自身发挥主导作用的合理性。最后,举例进行了分析说明,并给出了相关政策建议。Based on some features of real estate market,game theory is utilized to analyze the behavior of participants in real estate market.Firstly,the model of 3-sided assignment games among government,real estate developer and consumer is established.In general,a 3-sided assignment games may have an empty core,so the improved core method is used to solve the problem.Furthermore,compensation system in real estate market is proposed in order to sustain the long-term cooperation.After setting up the model of 2-sided assignment games between real estate developer and consumer and comparing it with 3-sided assignment games,it concludes that it is rational for the government not to be directly involved in real estate markets.It finally makes some policy suggestions through examples.

关 键 词：指派博弈 改进的核心法 土地出让金制度 补偿金制度 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]