低碳技术扩散中地方政府与中央政府行为的博弈分析  

Analysis of Central and Local Government Behavior Game in Low-Carbon Technology Diffusion

作　　者：王靖宇[1] 史安娜[1] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京210098

出　　处：《科技进步与对策》2011年第12期12-15,共4页Science & Technology Progress and Policy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(10BGL079)

摘　　要：运用讨价还价模型、具有唯一子博弈精炼纳什均衡的博弈模型对中央政府与地方政府的博弈行为进行分析,得出地方政府推动低碳技术扩散体系的最优选择及中央政府对地方政府关于低碳政策的权力分配、执行情况进行监督的最优行为选择,提出了加强信息传递渠道和反馈渠道建设、降低因信息不对称造成的费用、建立和完善中央与地方的分权机制以及改革地方政府政绩考核制度等措施。The paper analyzes game behavior between the central government and local government by using the bargaining models and Nash equilibrium game with the only sub game perfect,gets the optimal choice that local government to promote low-carbon technology diffusion system,and the central government＇s monitoring on local government＇ power distribution and implementation on low-carbon policies.According to the conclusions of paper to propose measures to enhance to build information delivery channels and feedback channels,reduce the cost caused by asymmetric information,establish and improve mechanisms for central and local government decentralization and reform of local government performance evaluation system.Ultimately reduce the carbon emissions economic development and improve environmental quality,realize social and economic sustainable development.

关 键 词：低碳技术 博弈分析 政策安排 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]