政府投资公益性建设项目的博弈分析  

Game Analysis of Government Investment Public Construction Projects

作　　者：侯玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江建设职业技术学院,浙江杭州311231

出　　处：《工程管理学报》2011年第3期323-327,共5页Journal of Engineering Management

摘　　要：目前我国政府投资公益性建设项目中普遍存在"三超"现象,政府机构与建设单位之间总是处于超投资,追加投资状态,为了深入探讨"三超"现象,引入博弈论方法,按照现行工程管理模式下信息不对称的特征及信息模型,建立了项目各主体之间的行为动态博弈模型,基于寻租经济理论,给出了混合纳什均衡解,根据均衡解给出解决权力寻租活动的相应对策,并提出完善推进代建制、有效监督机制和权力约束机制的政策建议,以从根本上杜绝建设项目的寻租行为,最大限度降低三超现象。At present, the budgetary overrun phenomenon widely exists in the Chinese government investment public projects. The government agencies and construction enterprises are always in the situation of over budget or additional investment. The game theory was introduced to further analyze the budgetary ovemm. The dynamic game model was set up based on the characteristics of asymmetric information and the information model under the project management mode. The paper used the rent seeking theory and discussed the conditions of rent seeking behavior in public construction projects, analyzed the game Nash equilibrium mixed strategy, and proposed the corresponding countermeasures rent-seeking activities. Some suggestions were put forward to fundamentally eliminate the rent-seeking behavior of construction projects and minimize the over budget phenomenon, including the promotion of agent construction system, the effective monitoring mechanism, and the power constraints mechanism.

关 键 词：政府投资 公益性项目 寻租理论 动态博弈 

分 类 号：F407.9[经济管理—产业经济]