溢出效应、价格规制与企业投资激励——以电信产业“共建共享”政策为视角  

Spillover Effect,Price Regulation and Investment Incentives:From the Angle of Construction Sharing in Telecommunications Industry

作　　者：韩聪[1] 夏大慰[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200433 [2]上海国家会计学院,上海201702

出　　处：《财经研究》2011年第7期114-123,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：电信运营商不愿参与"共建共享"缘于这项政策可能会降低产品差异化程度,加剧竞争。文章基于三阶段轮辐模型,从福利经济学角度考察无规制和存在接入价格规制情形下的最优投资水平发现,如果企业为争夺老用户竞争,溢出效应不仅会降低投资厂商与接入厂商之间的差异化,而且会导致厂商投资更加偏离社会最优投资水平;如果企业定位于拓展新用户,溢出效应反而可以提高全行业的经济效益,同时使得更多消费者享受到电信服务。但是,为消除市场失灵带来的投资偏离而采取价格规制政策会进一步扭曲厂商投资的激励。基于此,文章认为在电信用户迅速增长的今天,政府应出台更多"共建共享"的配套政策促进企业投资。The unwillingness of network operators to participate in construction sharing is due to the possible reduction in differentiation degree of products and more severe competition caused by this policy. Based on a threestage spokes model, this paper studies the optimal investment level with and without price regulation from the angle of welfare economics. It shows as follows： firstly, if firms are competing for existing customers, spillover effect will not only lead to the reduction in the difference between the investor and the invested, but also the greater deviation of dependent investment from social optimal investment level; secondly, if firms are aiming at the expansion of new customers, spillover effect can raise the economic performance of telecommunications industry and expand the coverage of telecommu- nications services. But price regulation policy which is taken to offset investment deviation caused by market imperfection will further distort investment incentives. So it considers that the governments should implement more policies matching for construction sharing to promote the investment with the rapid increase in telecommunication customers today.

关 键 词：共建共享 差异化产品 溢出效应 价格规制 

分 类 号：F269.22[经济管理—国民经济]