银行委托代理视角下的货币流动性过剩形成机理  

A Study of Formation Mechanism for Excess Currency Liquidity Based on Bank Principal-agent Theory

作　　者：李研妮[1] 冉茂盛[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第3期64-68,共5页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费(CDJXS11021117)

摘　　要：文章在总结产生次贷危机原因的相关文献后,从银行现实的委托代理问题出发,构建模型对银行货币流动性风险的形成原因进行分析。结论得出:代理问题引起管理者降低利率、过度放贷的报酬激励。在委托人引入审计检查的情况下,只有当宏观经济风险较高时,投资者为规避风险将项目投资转向银行储蓄,而较高的银行流动性弱化了管理者的惩罚约束,进而导致管理者过度放贷,引发资产价格泡沫,增加了系统性风险。After summarizing the reasons of subprime crisis happening in related literatures,the authors construct the model to analyze the reason of currency liquidity risk＇s formation based on the bank reality＇s principal-agent question.They get the conclusion： The proxy question causes the bank manager＇s payoff incentive to reduce the interest rate and makes loans excessively.In the situation that the trustee introduces the audit supervision,when there is heightened macroeconomics risk,investors reduce direct investment and hold more bank deposits.This＇right to quality＇leaves banks flush with liquidity,attenuates manager＇s penalty restraint,then causes the manager to make loans excessively and results in asset price bubbles,at last increases systemic risk.

关 键 词：货币流动性过剩 委托代理理论 资产泡沫 

分 类 号：F830.5[经济管理—金融学]