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作 者:张玲[1]
出 处:《浙江科技学院学报》2011年第3期225-228,共4页Journal of Zhejiang University of Science and Technology
摘 要:以面向再制造的回收处理为对象,考虑制造商、零售商和第三方3种回收主体,在利益驱动准则下,建立模型对比各回收主体下供应链成员的利润,并在Stackelberg博弈框架下进行模型求解和分析。最后通过算例验证模型的有效性和实用性。结果表明,当第三方不具备回收规模优势时,制造商或零售商都会尽量选择自身充当回收主体;而随着第三方规模的扩大,第三方会逐渐以回收主体的身份进入回收市场。Three types of recovery subjects for remanufacturing are considered: manufacturer, retailer and third-party enterprise. According to the benefit-driven rule, profit models of supply chain members are set up for each recovery subject. Models are solved and analyzed in Stackelberg game framework. An example was tested to verify the validity and efficiency of the models. The results show that manufacturer or retailer will become recovery subject when the third party doesn't have recovery scale advantage and that the third party will gradually become recovery subject with the expansion of its scale.
关 键 词:再制造 回收主体Stackelberg博弈 利益驱动准则
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