研发竞赛中参与人的策略与发起者的收益研究  

Contestants' strategy choices and sponsor's revenue in R&D contest

作　　者：彭鸿广[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江科技学院经济管理学院,杭州310023 [2]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《浙江科技学院学报》2011年第3期234-238,共5页Journal of Zhejiang University of Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630208)

摘　　要：建立了具有2个竞赛参与人的研发竞赛的非合作博弈模型,分别探讨了研发质量随机环境和研发质量确定性环境下竞赛参与人的均衡策略和竞赛发起者的期望收益。研究发现:在研发质量随机环境下存在着参与人的纯策略纳什均衡,而在研发质量确定性环境下只存在竞赛参与人的混合策略纳什均衡;当2个竞赛参与者的研发效率相同时,竞赛发起者的期望收益皆随参与者研发效率的降低而降低;当竞赛参与者研发效率的差异低于一定程度时,研发质量随机环境下的竞赛发起者的期望收益要低于研发质量确定环境下的期望收益。A non-cooperative game model of R＆D contest with two contestants is built and the optimal strategies of the contestants and compares the revenue of sponsor under the circumstances of stochastic R＆D quality and deterministic R＆D quality are discussed. The research shows that there exists pure strategy Nash equilibrium under the circumstance of stochastic R＆D quality and there exists mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under the circumstance of deterministic R＆D quality. When R＆D efficiencies of two contestants are the same, the sponsor＇s revenue decreases with R＆D efficiencies. When two contestants＇ R＆D efficiencies differ less than some degree, the sponsor can achieve more revenue under the circumstance of deterministic R＆D quality.

关 键 词：研发竞赛 研发质量 固定奖励 

分 类 号：G311[文化科学] O25[理学—数学]