电子商务从C2C到C2B2C模式的博弈分析  

A Game-Theoretic Study on C2C to C2B2C Model of E-Commerce

作　　者：戴建华[1] 陈阳升 阚凯力[3] 

机构地区：[1]中国传媒大学媒体管理学院 [2]中国移动通信集团浙江有限公司宁波分公司 [3]北京邮电大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《中国传媒大学学报（自然科学版）》2011年第2期64-68,13,共6页Journal of Communication University of China：Science and Technology

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71001009)

摘　　要：在电子商务领域中,技术不是决定性因素,对交易模式的创新,也能收到良好的效益。针对C2C电子商务中的信用管理,本文提出了C2C电子商务中新的模式即C2B2C模式,从理论上推导出信用管理不完善最终会导致C2C电子商务逐渐萎缩,并促使C2B2C模式的出现。在这个模式下电子商务网站以大的买家和卖家的身份参与到交易中,同时从交易中获利。通过博弈分析可知,在该C2B2C模式下卖家会变的不再欺诈,而买家也变成信任的买家,这就从根本解决了电子商务现有信用管理的缺点。In e-commerce,technology is not the decisive factor,the innovation of transaction model can also get a good return.In connection with the credit management in C2C e-commerce,this paper presents C2B2C which is a new model derived from C2C,theoretically deduces that imperfect credit management of C2C will eventually lead to shrinking,and to promote the emergence of C2B2C mode.In this mode,e-commerce site takes part in the transaction as a large buyer and then a seller,while it gets profit from the transaction.By game analysis,it comes to a conclusion that sellers become no longer fraud and buyers turn to trust the sellers in C2B2C,which thoroughly solves the shortcomings of e-commerce credit management.

关 键 词：电子商务 博弈 C2C C2B2C 

分 类 号：F713.36[经济管理—产业经济]