信息透明度对公司过度投资与融资约束的影响研究  

The Effect of Information Transparency on Over-investment and Financing Constraints

作　　者：张兴亮[1,2] 夏成才[2] 

机构地区：[1]嘉兴学院商学院 [2]中南财经政法大学会计学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2011年第8期39-49,共11页Research on Economics and Management

摘　　要：本文基于2002～2009年深交所上市公司的非平衡面板数据,验证了国有控制公司存在过度投资,而非国有控制公司既存在融资约束又存在过度投资。对于国有控制公司,信息透明度发挥了治理作用,显著减少了过度投资;然而由于政府干预而使其承担的社会性负担等原因,即使在透明度较高的公司中依然存在过度投资。信息透明度同样治理了非国有控制公司中的代理问题,高透明度的公司主要存在融资约束,而非过度投资;但因制度环境的制约,信息透明度的提高并没有显著降低这些公司受到的融资约束。Basing on unbalanced panel data of listed companies from Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2004 to 2009, this paper finds that there is over - investment in state - owned enterprises, and that there are both over - investment and financing constraints in non - state - owned enterprises. For state - owned enterprises, information transparency plays a role of governance which mitigates over - investment. Nevertheless, there is still over - investment even in highest trans- parent state - owned enterprises because of government intervention. Information transparency also plays a positive role on governing agency problem in non - state - owned enterprises, so there is financing constraints rather than over - investment in higher transparent non - state - owned enterprises. However, for the constraint of institution environment, the rise of information transparency can not significantly alleviate financing constraint in such enterprises. There are some illumina- tions resulting from this paper such as, government should not intervene in state - owned enterprises excessively, political connections which can alleviate financing constraints in non - state - owned enterprises are sometimes costly

关 键 词：终极产权 信息透明度 政治关系 过度投资 融资约束 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]