中国农村公共服务均等化供给的政治经济逻辑  

The Political Economy Logic of Public ServicesEqualized Supply in Rural China

作　　者：胡志平[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东政法大学政治理论部,上海201620

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第4期521-527,共7页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(10YJC710004)

摘　　要：农村公共服务均等化问题不仅仅存在财政逻辑,更重要的是存在政治经济逻辑,通过研究中国农村公共服务非均等化供给,发现其存在一个"三位一体"的政治经济逻辑:即宏观上的绩效合法型与城市偏向,中观上的政府职能的"重经济轻服务"偏向和微观上的经济行为主体的强激励与弱约束偏向。因而要实现中国农村公共服务从非均等化供给逐步走向均等化供给,就必须改变其存在"三位一体"的政治经济逻辑,创新政治合法性基础来源与城乡关系,由政府职能转向经济社会平衡发展,构建激励与约束平衡机制。There is not only the financial logic,but more importantly,the political economy logic of the equalization of public service in rural areas.There exists a ＂trinity＂ political economy logic in rural public service by researching non equal supply of the Chinese rural public service：the performance legitimate type and city bias in macro political economy logic,particular stress on economic and less stress on service in mid political economy logic,and the economic behavior agents＇ strong incentive and weak constraint bias in micro-political economy logic.In order to realize China＇s rural public service from the non equal access to the equal supply,it is needed to reconstruct the ＂trinity＂ political economy logic,i.e.to innovate the political legitimacy foundation of the source and urban-rural relationship,to turn the government functions to economic and social balanced development,and to construct incentive and restraint mechanisms.

关 键 词：农村公共服务 均等化供给 政治经济逻辑 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]