基于激励与约束双效性的经营者股票期权制度研究  

Research on the Executive Stock Option System on the Basis of its Incentive and Restraint Effect

作　　者：陈勇[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学,安徽蚌埠233041

出　　处：《铜陵学院学报》2011年第3期40-43,共4页Journal of Tongling University

基　　金：安徽省高校青年教师资助计划项目<国有企业薪酬管理与长期激励制度创新研究>(编号:2008JQW058);安徽财经大学青年科研重点项目<转轨经济中我国上市公司治理与战略绩效的关系研究>(编号:ACKYQ0707ZD)成果之一

摘　　要：以激励约束机制理论和企业长期发展战略有机协调为出发点,文章阐述了股票期权制度内在作用机理和激励约束逻辑,通过理论基础论述,指出股票期权的实质是经营者人力资本产权化的有效实现形式,是一种具有激励与约束双重功效的制度安排。based on how to get coordination between the encouragement institution and enterprise＇s long-term development target,the paper states the internal mechanism and the logic between its incentive and restraint effects of the stock option system.Based on theoretic exposition,points that this system is substantially the effective way of turning human capital into property rights.With two effects of this system,the incentive one will work only when there is an effective restraint effect in it.

关 键 词：经营者股票期权 激励 约束 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]