个人账户基金委托代理关系中的激励约束机制  

Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms in Personal Account Agency Relationships

作　　者：徐萍[1] 

机构地区：[1]陕西师范大学国际商学院,西安710062

出　　处：《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第4期78-82,共5页Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：陕西省人文社科基金项目(08E036);教育部人文社科青年基金项目(09YC840023);陕西师范大学"211工程"三期建设项目"中国特色社会主义发展经济学"

摘　　要：个人账户基金投资管理中由于信息不对称产生的逆向选择和道德风险问题,使其"防老"功能无法实现。为了保证个人账户基金安全性的基础上实现其收益性,需要建立有效的监督管理机制,有必要设计激励约束机制:对投资管理人设立合理的激励系数K,并以最低收益担保值为基准,设立约束机制,通过控制投资管理人的回报来改变其行为,确保委托人和代理人的利益保持一致,防止投资管理人在投资管理过程中因追求自身利益最大化而损害参保人的利益。The adverse selection and moral hazard problems generated by information asymmetry in individual account fund investment management make the function of ＂providing insurance for old ages＂ can not be achieved.In order to ensure the profitability of personal account fund based on safety,we should build effective supervision and management mechanism,and prevent the insured person＇supervision and management functions from absence,while the government needs to design incentive and restraint mechanisms： settinh up reasonable incentive coefficient K（0K1） for the investment managers,establishing restraint mechanisms based on minimum benefit value guarantee,controlling the investment managers＇return to change their behaviors,ensuring that the clients＇interests keep consistent with the principals,and preventing the investment managers from undermining clients＇interests in order to maximize their own interests in the process of invest management.

关 键 词：个人账户基金 委托代理 激励约束 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]