协调博弈均衡随机稳定性的研究现状与展望  

The Literature Review: Stochastic Stability of Equilibrium in Coordination Game

作　　者：张良桥[1,2] 董翠玲[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院,广东广州510275 [2]顺德职业技术学院经济管理学院,广东顺德528333

出　　处：《技术经济与管理研究》2011年第7期22-25,共4页Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基　　金：国家社科基金(09ZDB17&09ZDB18);省自然科学基金(05300601)

摘　　要：协调博弈均衡选择不仅依赖于博弈支付,更重要的是依赖于参与人之间复杂的行为预期过程,它是继囚徒困境博弈模型之后又一被广泛研究的博弈类型,本文基于随机稳定性思想,结合已有的研究文献,基于实验经济学的研究结果阐述了除博弈支付之外还有许多其他影响均衡稳定性的因素,在此基础上,进一步论述了相关理论模型的研究结论及其存在的缺陷,因此,要更现实地研究协调博弈均衡的稳定性,就需要加入除博弈支付之外的其他因素,最后,文章结合实验研究及理论模型提出了协调博弈均衡稳定性研究的思路与方向,为学者们进一步研究提供了新的视角。Balanced Choice Coordination Game equilibrium depends not only on Game cover, more importantly it depends on more complex behavioral expectation processes of participants. Extensive researches are given to Coordination Game Theory after the Prisoner＇s Dilemma Game model. Base on the idea of stochastic stable and researches on existing literature in the area, as well as the findings of experimental economics, this paper discusses further on the conclusions and flaws of related theoretical model. Hence, in order to give more realistic study on the stochastic stable state of coordination game theory, it is necessary to add in factors other than Game cover. Finally, with experimental study and theoretical model study, this paper presents thoughts and directions on the study of equilibrium stability of the coordination game, which provide new perspective to further study.

关 键 词：协调博弈 随机稳定 均衡选择 不变突变 可变突变 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]