零售商强势的供应链VMI模式演化机理研究  

Evolutionary Mechanism of VMI in Supply Chain with a Powerful Retailer

作　　者：赵道致[1] 吕昕[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2011年第8期1207-1212,共6页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771073)

摘　　要：针对目前普遍存在的供应链下游零售商较上游供应商强势的现状,探讨供应商管理库存(VMI)模式的演化机理问题。分别建立了传统库存模式与VMI模式下具有强势零售商的供应链模型,得到不同库存策略下零售商和供应商的支付矩阵。在此基础上,借助双种群演化博弈方法,分别从短期和长期角度对参与双方的演化稳定均衡进行分析。揭示了此供应链结构中,使参与双方获得双赢的VMI能否成功实施的潜在演化机理和关键影响因素。研究结果表明,随着销售量的增加,供应商和零售商在短期和长期的均衡策略分别为(不实施VMI,不实施VMI)和(不实施VMI,不实施VMI)与(实施VMI,实施VMI)共存的情况。进一步分析了利润变化、投资成本与惩罚成本对均衡结果的影响。Targeting at the ubiquity of more bargaining power that upstream retailer has than downstream supplier in a supply chain,evolutionary mechanism of vender managed inventory model is discussed.Under traditional inventory mode and VMI mode,supply chain models with powerful retailer are constructed respectively so as to obtain a payoff matrix of different inventory strategies.On this basis,by using double groups＇ evolutionary method,evolutionary stable strategies（ESS） are derived and analyzed in short and long term perspective.It is revealed that the intrinsic evolutionary mechanism and key factors to the win-win implementation of VMI in this paper.It＇s shown that the evolutionary stable strategies in different periods are respectively（not implementing VMI,not implementing VMI） and（not implementing VMI,not implementing VMI） coexisting with（implementing VMI,implementing VMI） as the transaction quantity increases in the long run.In addition,the effects of profit change,investment cost and penalties on equilibrium have also been analyzed.

关 键 词：零售商强势 库存管理 VMI 演化博弈 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] F713.32