地方政府在保护主义与引资偏好产业政策选择中的动态博弈分析  

Dynamic Game Theoretical Analysis on the Industrial Policy Options of Local Governments about Protectionism and Capital Attracting

作　　者：张国民[1] 陈进[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《技术与创新管理》2011年第4期369-373,共5页Technology and Innovation Management

基　　金：教育部人文科学项目(07JA630070);上海市教委科研创新项目(09YS231);上海市研究生创新基金项目(JWCXSL1022)

摘　　要：后金融危机时代的新经济形势下,产业转型和结构调整成为了必然趋势。其中,转变地方政府发展经济的思维模式十分关键。在我国,作为经济发展主体的地方政府的产业政策决定着地方产业和经济发展的未来。运用博弈论的方法,构建一个产业政策选择的有限完全信息动态博弈模型,并利用该模型在地方保护主义的产业扶持和提供外部经济环境的引资偏好的政策选择之间求取精炼纳什均衡解。可以得到合理利用地方比较优势,积极营建优越的引资环境,改善产业经营效率,提升地方政府区域竞争力,进而改善社会总体福利水平,为地方政府出台产业政策提供理论依据和现实建议。Faced with the new economic situation after the Financial Crisis,the transformation and structural adjustment of industries become the necessary trend.Among these,it is essential to change the modes of thinking to develop economy.Because in China,local governments have become the main entity of development,whose policies determines the future of industries and economics.This paper uses dynamic game theory,build up a mode of industrial policy choices with the limit perfect information.This mode will get a solution of perfect Nash Equilibrium on the policies choice between local protectionism industrial policy support and capital attracting which offer external economy situation.This conclusion will show that to display local comparative advantage reasonably and build a positive capital attraction environment actively will be able to improve industry operation efficiency and enhance competitive power of local government,and then modify the welfare level of the entire society..

关 键 词：地方保护主义 外部经济 比较优势 产业政策 精炼纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]