大型零售商收取通道费合理吗?——来自信号传递模型的解释  

Is It Reasonable for Large Retailers Collecting Slotting Allowances?——The Explanation from a Signaling Model

作　　者：王永培[1] 袁平红[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学商学院,北京100872 [2]安徽财经大学商学院,安徽蚌埠233041

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2011年第7期5-12,共8页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"流通主导渠道的生成机理及其效率增进机制研究"(70772009)

摘　　要：文章对通道费的相关理论进行了总结,并通过一个包含批发价格和通道费的信号传递模型,分析了非对称信息下通道费的渠道结构优化机制。在零售商的销售成本充分高的情况下,通道费构成了不完全信息动态博弈中剔除劣战略均衡的合约安排的必要条件,能够有效地区别高市场需求和低市场需求的制造商。因此,通道费并不必然是零售商滥用市场势力的工具,在众多的情况下通道费为合理配置货架空间,优化商品流通渠道,以及调整制造商的产品结构提供了有效的信息甄别工具。This paper summarizes the theory of slotting allowances,and analyzes the mechanism of channel structure optimization under the asymmetric information by using a signaling model with wholesale prices and slotting allowances.Under the situation of full sales cost of retailers,slotting allowances constitute the necessary condition of contract arrangement in an incomplete information dynamic game with iterated dominated strategy equilibrium,and they can effectively distinguish high market demand manufacturers from low market demand manufacturers.Therefore,slotting allowances are not necessarily the tools for retailers to abuse market power.In many cases,slotting allowances provide effective information-screening tools for rational allocation of shelf space,optimization of commodity circulation channels,and adjustment of manufacturer＇s product structure.

关 键 词：零售商 制造商 通道费 信号传递 

分 类 号：F225.9[经济管理—国民经济]