发展中国家债务解决机制中“恶债原则”的政治经济学分析  

Political-economics Analysis on Odious Debt Doctrine in Debt Settlement Mechanism of Developing Countries

作　　者：洪晖[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学外语学院,北京100029

出　　处：《国际商务（对外经济贸易大学学报）》2011年第4期5-11,共7页INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

摘　　要：在经济全球化的背景下,发展中国家,尤其是非洲的低收入国家面临着由于沉重的债务负担引发的自身经济增长和经济发展的可持续性问题。恶债原则国际机制的提出是基于两个假设:一是具有独立的经过授权的国际机构,二是只能对未来的而不是已有的债务进行判断。无论是从民族国家为主体构成的国际关系角度,还是从理性经济人的成本收益比较分析来看,当前国际政治经济秩序下恶债原则的推行基本表现为不可行。In the context of economic globalization, developing countries, particularly low-income countries in Africa are faced with economic growth and economic development sustainability problems caused by heavy debt burden. Since there are still many uncertainties and unfavorable factors in the establishment of an international odious debt settlement mechanism, from the view of international relations between nations and states or from the perspective of profits and cost, it＇s highly unlikely to carry out the odious debt doctrine in the current international political and economic order.

关 键 词：发展中国家 恶债原则 国际关系 政治经济学分析 

分 类 号：F112.1[经济管理—国际贸易]