免于强制的自我与无根的自由——哈耶克自由理论的困境  

Self without Enforcement and Freedom without Root:Predicament of Hayek's Liberalism

作　　者：林少敏[1] 

机构地区：[1]福建师范大学公共管理学院,福州350007

出　　处：《北京师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第4期128-134,共7页Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"现代权利主体的价值选择与政治认同研究"(07BZZ004)

摘　　要：以哈耶克等人为代表的当代自由主义,肇始于对20世纪国家主义的深刻反省和强烈反弹,进而重寻与古典自由主义新的结合以应对当代困局。针对国家对个人新的奴役的威胁,哈耶克激烈地重申免于强制的自我、强调保障个人自由,并以人之"无知"或"理性不及"作为其自由理论的知识论根据。但是,不仅以"无知"为据并不能证成自由,而且,哈耶克对自由的证明既是后果论的又是过程论的,对立的主张与论证逻辑构成了其理论的悖论,并最终导致哈耶克重蹈他所极力反对的形而上学。Modern liberalism represented by Hayek and others starts from the profound nationalism and strong rebound of nationalism in the 20th century, and then re-seeks the new combination with the classical liberalism to deal with the current predicament. For new threats of enslavement to individuals by countries, Hayek strongly reclaims self without enforcemcnt, stresses individual freedom, and bases its theory of freedom on man＇s ＂ignorance＂ or ＂rationality deficiency＂. However, the theory of ＂ignorance＂ cannot guarantee freedom, and the freedom proved by Hayek is both of consequentialism and process theory. Contradictory views and logical arguments form the paradoxes of his theory, and hence results in the metaphysics he strongly objects.

关 键 词：自我 自由 无知 后果论 过程个人主义 

分 类 号：I561.5[文学—其他各国文学]