基于Nash协商博弈的关联供应链合作行为研究  

Research on the Cooperative Behavior of Interrelated Supply Chains Based on Nash Negotiation Game

作　　者：李海燕[1] 宋寒[1] 饶凯 

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学工商管理学院,重庆400054 [2]比萨圣安娜大学,比萨意大利56127

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2011年第3期31-36,共6页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家863计划资助项目(2007AA040801);重庆理工大学引进人才科研启动基金项目(2009ZD24)

摘　　要：为了实现工业废弃物充分再利用同时又获得经济效益,研究了基于工业废弃物再利用关联供应链核心生产商间的合作行为优化问题。首先分析了关联供应链中两个核心生产商主从合作行为存在的不合理性,进而论证了关联供应链合作中存在的利益冲突,然后基于非对称Nash协商模型提出了一种关联供应链合作机制。结果表明,基于该机制的关联供应链核心生产商间的合作行为能够使得系统利润最大化的同时使上、下游生产商的利润得到改善,实现关联供应链系统经济绩效及环境绩效的最优化。最后,利用具体数值实例验证了该合作机制的效率。For reusing wastes fully and gaining economic income in interrelated supply chains,the cooperative behavior of the core manufacturers is studied in interrelated supply chains based on the reuse of industrial wastes.The unreasonability of Stackelberg coaperative behavior and the benefit conflict between the two core manufacturers.Furthermore,the cooperative mechanism based on Nash negotiation model is established are illuminated.Results show that not only the optimal income of the whole interrelated supply chains can be obtained,but also the income of the two core manufacturers can be improved greatly by performing the cooperative behavior.Finally,the efficiency of the cooperative mechanism is verified by data experiment.

关 键 词：资源环境 废弃物 Nash协商博弈 合作行为 关联供应链 

分 类 号：F403.3[经济管理—产业经济] F205