终极控制权、审计师行业专长与盈余稳健性  

Ultimate Control,Auditor Industry Expertise and Earnings Robustness

作　　者：龙振海[1] 胡奕明[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052

出　　处：《财经研究》2011年第8期59-68,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772061)

摘　　要：文章探讨了上市公司终极控制权和审计师行业专长对会计盈余信息稳健性的影响。研究结果表明,终极控制权与现金流权的分离程度越大,公司的盈余信息越不稳健;相对于非行业专长审计师审计的公司,专长审计师审计的公司对损失的确认更及时;更重要的是发现具有行业专长的审计师能够显著抑制由于终极控制权分离所造成的会计盈余信息不稳健的行为。国内外学者研究表明,稳健的会计盈余信息能够导致正面的经济后果,文章的研究结论暗示雇佣一个行业专长的会计师事务所对存在终极控制权分离的公司是有利的。This paper discusses the effects of ultimate control of listed companies and auditor industry expertise on earnings robustness. The results show as follows, firstly, firms with greater separation of ultimate control from cash flow right have less robust earnings information; secondly, compared to firms audited by auditors without industry expertise, firms audited by auditors with industry expertise timelier recognize losses; thirdly, auditors with industry expertise can obviously restrict the non-robustness of earnings information because of the separation of ultimate control. The stud- ies of domestic and foreign scholars show that robust earnings information gives rise to positive economic effects, and the research findings suggest that to hire an audit firm with industry expertise is advantageous to firms with the separation of ultimate control.

关 键 词：审计师专长 稳健性 控制权分离 现金流权 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]