考虑地区交流因素的政府干预模式的演化博弈分析  

The Evolutionary Game Analysis on Interference Way of Government Considering Interchange of Different Regions

作　　者：刘广珠[1] 王斌[2] 

机构地区：[1]青岛科技大学经济与管理学院,山东青岛266061 [2]青岛理工大学计算机学院,山东青岛266033

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2011年第10期136-138,共3页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(79830010)

摘　　要：政府对企业采取不同的干预方式,会产生完全不同的效果。采取何种有效措施使不恰当的干预方式向正确的干预方式演化是一个十分重要的问题。文章运用演化博弈的方法,构造了一个不同地区政府和企业交流的演化博弈模型,在考虑历史初期条件及路径依赖性等因素的前提下,分析了通过加强不同地区政府和企业的接触与交流,使落后地区由帕累托劣位均衡向优势均衡演化,给出了演化成功和失败应满足的条件。Different interferences of government in enterprises will lead to different results.It is very important to take an effective measurement that can evolve the unsuitable interference method to a correct one.Through the evolutionary game theory,this paper builds an evolutionary game model considering government and enterprises interchange in different area.Under the condition of path dependence and different initial stage of history,the paper analyzes how to promote the contact and interchange between government and enterprises in different area,transforms the backward area from inferior equilibrium to superior equilibrium one,and conclude sthe condition of successful evolution and failed evolution.

关 键 词：演化博弈 政府干预 交流与接触 路径依赖 优势均衡 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]