多层次道德风险与小银行运营模式  

Multi-layer Moral Hazards and Operating Mode of Small Banks

作　　者：杜创[1] 张星铜[2] 

机构地区：[1]中国社会科学院经济研究所微观经济研究室 [2]南开大学软件学院

出　　处：《金融评论》2011年第3期70-78,125,共9页Chinese Review of Financial Studies

基　　金：中国社会科学院重大课题"微型金融机构治理结构研究"的资助

摘　　要：本文运用信息经济学中的激励系统理论(incentive system theory)分析了小银行运营模式,揭示了该模式各组成要素之间的互补性及其如何被用以解决银行运营中的多层次道德风险问题,并与大银行(中小企业部)的运营模式进行了比较。主要结论及政策含义是:不同规模银行的运营模式之间不具有可复制性,大银行设立中小企业部(或子银行)并不能从根本上解决中小企业融资难的问题;小银行与存款人、贷款客户之间形成了相互链接、相互制衡的利益关系,其运营风险并没有想象中的大,放开民营资本进入银行业是风险可控的;应承认小银行在股权结构上适度集中及股东主要由当地(法)人组成的合理性,不宜一刀切地要求引入外地战略投资者。In the paper the operation mode of small banks are analyzed with the incentive system theory. Complemen-tarities of elements of the operation mode, and how they are used simultaneously to solve multi-layer moral hazard problems in the operation of banks, are explained and compared with the operation mode of large banks’ special SME divisions. Main Results are as follows. First, the financing problem of small and medium enterprises could not be fundamentally solved by large banks’ special SME divisions, since operating modes of banks of different sizes are different and complementary. Second, it is risk-controllable to open bank industry to private capitals, for there are mutual restraints among a small bank and its depositors and borrowers, thus its operating risk is smaller than thought. Third, there are some justifications that allow small banks’ ownership structures moderately concentrated and their shareholders mainly composed of local persons/enterprises, thus introducing foreign strategic investors would not be always appropriate.

关 键 词：道德风险 银行运营 互补性 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]