地方政府投资行为、地区性行政垄断与经济增长——基于转型期中国省级面板数据的分析  

Local Government Investment,Administrative Monopoly and Economic Growth——Evidence from Chinese Provincial Panel Data

作　　者：张卫国[1] 任燕燕[2] 花小安 

机构地区：[1]山东社会科学院经济研究所 [2]山东大学经济学院 [3]广发银行南通分行

出　　处：《经济研究》2011年第8期26-37,共12页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：山东省科学技术发展计划(软科学部分)重大项目"提升山东软实力的综合集成战略研究"(批准号2008RKA001);山东省自然科学基金项目"平行数据模型的有关问题研究"(批准号Y2007A03)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文依据1994—2007年中国省级面板数据分析地方政府投资行为、地区性行政垄断及经济增长之间的关系。结果表明,现阶段地区性行政垄断对地区经济增长具有倒U型影响,而且绝大多数省份行政垄断促进了经济增长。同时,地区性行政垄断对地方政府投资具有正U型影响,且二者关系处于正U型下降通道中。就现阶段而言,地方政府投资及地区性行政垄断均有效促进了地方经济增长,并且二者具有明显替代效应。长远来看,地区性行政垄断不利于全国整体市场规模经济效应的发挥,政治租金的获得损害了经济效率。This paper investigates the relationship between local government investment, administrative monopoly and economic growth based on Chinese provincial panel data from 1994 to 2007. The results show that the administrative monopoly has inverse U-shaped effect on local economic growth and current administrative monopoly level promotes local economic growth significantly for most provinces; in addition, administrative monopoly has U-shaped effect on local government investment and the relationship between them is still among the descending side. Currently, both administrative monopoly and local government investment boost the local economic growth and they have the substitution effect of each other. In the long term, however, administrative monopoly is harmful for the countrywide marketed scale effect as a whole. Political rents are in cost of economic efficiency.

关 键 词：地方政府投资行为 地区性行政垄断 经济增长及其长期有效性 

分 类 号：F127[经济管理—世界经济] D625[政治法律—政治学]