基于博弈论的非点源污染控制模型探讨  

Modeling Nonpoint Source Pollution Control from the View of Game Theory

作　　者：张蔚文[1] 刘飞[1] 王新艳[2] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310029 [2]京都大学农学研究科

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2011年第8期142-146,共5页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:70873107)

摘　　要：随着对工业和城市生活污水等点源污染治理能力的不断增强,农业非点源污染对水质环境的影响日益凸现。相对于点源污染,非点源污染发生的不确定时间、不确定途径、不确定量等特点给治理政策的制定带来很大难度。本文从著名的公地悲剧现象出发,着力从市场博弈及政府监督博弈两个模型分析非点源污染制造者之间的博弈格局,并提出以"集体表现"的形式对非点源污染进行管理和控制。市场博弈模型中以一定的排污削减目标为前提,确定以成本最优的原则进行点源-非点源排污权交易是可行且有效率的;而政府监督博弈模型的结果显示:合理的环境补贴和惩罚机制、政府对自身声誉及公众形象的重视及维护对非点源污染治理起正向促进作用。With the increasing ability to deal with point source pollution,such as industrial and urban life sewage,the impact of agricultural non-point source pollution on water quality environment has become more and more apparent.Compared with point source pollution,non-point source pollution occurs at an uncertain time,in an uncertain way and with uncertain quantity,which brings much more difficulties to the making of some relevant control policies.Beginning with the famous phenomenon of the Tragedy of Commons,this paper analyzes the game situation among the non-point pollution makers based on the marketing game model and the government supervision game model,and then proposes a way to manage and control non-point pollution in the form of ＂collective performance＂.Premising with the target of decreasing pollutant discharge,marketing game model proves that it is feasible and efficient to do the trade on point-nonpoint source pollution on the basis of the principle of Optimal Cost,while the results of the government supervision game model show that： a reasonable environment subsidy and punishment mechanism,and government＇s attaching importance to the self-reputation and public image will play a positive role in promoting non-point source pollution control.

关 键 词：非点源污染 博弈论 公地悲剧 排污权交易 政府监管 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济]