排污权交易系统中政府监管策略分析  

Study on Supervision Mechanism in Emissions Trading System

作　　者：金帅[1,2] 盛昭瀚[2] 杜建国[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学工商管理学院,江苏镇江212013 [2]南京大学社会科学实验中心,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2011年第4期174-183,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70731002);教育部博士点科研基金资助项目(20090091110001)

摘　　要：有效监管是发挥排污权交易制度优越性的根本前提。本文通过构建管制者与排污企业之间的两阶段博弈模型,在分析排污权交易条件下企业行为特征的基础上,从监管力度、许可证分配、违规处罚结构三方面,对有效实现总量控制目标的最优监管对策进行均衡分析。基于博弈分析结论并针对其不足,利用社会科学计算实验方法,构建基于异质主体的排污权交易实验平台,从动态、有限理性的视角对复杂系统监管策略进行验证分析。结果表明:实现总量控制的最优机制设计是激励企业守法排放。这并不是单纯地设置更高的惩罚力度,而是需要追求监管水平与处罚力度的统一。整合了许可证价格的动态监管策略能够更加成本有效的确保环境质量目标达成。Effective supervision is the fundamental premise of emissions trading programs to exert advantages.In a two-stage dynamic game of regulator and polluting firms,the optimal supervision strategies to achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively in emissions trading system is studied,including supervision level,the aggregate supply of permits and penalty shape.Based on gaming analysis,a heterogeneous agent-based experiment platform for regional emissions trading system is established using computational experiment.Then further analysis are done from perspectives of dynamic and bounded rational.The results show that,the optimal strategy to achieve target is to induce full compliance.This is not simply setting severe punishment,but seeking tradeoff between level of supervision and penalty.Finally,integrating the permit price directly into the penalty shape allows the policy objective to be achieved more cost-effective.

关 键 词：排污权交易系统 监管策略 博弈分析 计算实验 

分 类 号：F205[经济管理—国民经济] X32[环境科学与工程—环境工程]