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作 者:汪冲[1]
机构地区:[1]南京财经大学财政与税务学院,江苏南京210046
出 处:《上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2011年第4期75-81,共7页Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
基 金:江苏高校优势学科建设工程项目;国家自然科学基金项目(70663012);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(09YJC790137);南京财经大学科研基金项目(C0806;A2010001)
摘 要:由土地资源属性和制度决定,国有土地供应出让中形成了受到土地利用规划约束和上级政府管制,由数百个城市"寡头厂商"组成的土地一级供应市场,并产生了诸多策略行为和机会主义做法。本文运用2003-2008年282个城市面板数据的单方程和联立方程空间计量模型,检验了城市政府围绕土地供应市场份额的策略互动影响、土地信贷融资和土地出让垄断利润的数量关系,并据此构造目标供应量、实际收益和惩罚三者相结合博弈策略选择空间,以形成激励地方政府改善土地供应的财政约束机制。Constrained by the propernes oi tanu state-owned land supply and transfer have formed the primary supply market composed of hundreds city-based oligopolistic enterprises, which is also subject to the land-use planning constraints and the regulation of higher-level governments, leading to strategic and oppor- tunistic behavior. Using single and simultaneous spatial econometric models based on the panel data of 282 cities in China from 2003 to 2008, this paper examines the strategic interac- tion among local governments concerning relative market share and the quantitative relation- ship between land credit financing and monopolistic profits of land transfer, and accordingly constructs a strategy choice space with the combination of target supply, real benefits and penalties, in order to form fiscal restraint mechanism which encourages local governments' improvement of land supply.
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