财政分权、地方政府行为与劳动者报酬份额  

Fiscal Decentralization,Local Government Behavior and Labor Compensation Share

作　　者：吴岩[1] 

机构地区：[1]广东科学技术职业学院,广东广州510640

出　　处：《改革与战略》2011年第8期27-29,共3页Reformation & Strategy

摘　　要：中国经济高速增长伴随劳动份额快速下降,为什么会产生这种现象引起广泛的关注,文章从财政分权的视角进行了研究。在财政分权的激励和约束之下,地方政府为实现经济增长和晋升的目标,弱化对劳动者的保护,以便为"招商引资"创造良好"投资环境"。文章通过建立2000-2009年全国范围内和区域范围内的省级面板数据模型,验证了财政分权对劳动者收入份额的影响以及存在的区域差异,并提出改进目前以GDP作为主要指标的政绩考核机制、从制度上提高劳动收入占比的政策建议。Labor share in China has declined rapidly with drastic economic growth rate. This paper decomposes the labor share in area and finds the fiscal decentralization is part of the reason for declining labor share. Local government should support the development trade unions, handle all kinds of labor disputes fairly, continuously improve social security coverage and quality, to strengthen labor protection and improve labor share in the system. This paper establishes the data model both national wide and regional from 2000-2009, concludes that fiscal decentralization and the regional difference has impact on labor income, and then proposes relevant suggestions.

关 键 词：财政分权 地方政府行为 劳动者报酬 

分 类 号：F240[经济管理—劳动经济]