政治关联、审计师选择与审计师独立性——基于中国A股民营上市公司的经验证据  

Political Connections, Auditor Choice, and Auditor Independence： Evidence from Private A-Share Listed Firms in China

作　　者：李敏才[1] 罗党论[2] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院 [2]中山大学岭南(大学)学院

出　　处：《中国会计与财务研究》2011年第2期1-44,共44页China Accounting and Finance Review

基　　金：我们感谢两位匿名审稿人的建议与评论,特别感谢执行编辑吴东辉教授的宝贵意见,也感谢2009年中国会计与财务研究国际研讨会的参与者的宝贵意见.另外感谢中山大学刘峰教授、郑国坚副教授;重庆大学辛清泉副教授等的中肯意见.当然,文责自负.本文得到了国家自然科学基金项目（70772080）、国家自然科学基金青年项目（项目号70902024、71003108、71002057）、广东省人文社会科学重点基金重大项目“法律风险、政治关系与审计师选择”、中山大学经济研究所基地建设经费项目与中山大学青年教师培育项的资助.

摘　　要：民营企业建立政治关联的动机与国有企业大相径庭，民营企业大多是主动寻求型的政治关联，而国有企业则是被动施加型的政治关联。Wang et al．（2008）发现国有企的审计师选择及审计师独立性具有显著的特征，如偏向于选择本地小所，并与本地小所合谋等。因为在当地辖区内，当地政府更易干预注册会计师审计意见，从而可能导致审计质量的下降。那么民营企业的政治关联如何影响审计师选择及审计师独立性P本文以2004至2009年A股民营上市公司作为样本，从民营上市公司参与政治关联的动机的角度进行研究发现，有政治关联的民营上市公司更不愿意选择大所，更偏好选择本地小所。政治关联还能降低会计师事务所的独立性，即减弱民营上市公司盈余管理水平与审计意见之间的正相关关系，在一定的盈余管理水平下，有政治关联的民营上市公司能够获得审计师更清洁的审计意见。进一步地，这种独立性的下降主要来源于小所或本地小所，大所独立性保持较高水平。本文的研究表明，国有企业对审计师选择及审计师独立性的影响通过政府干预进行，而民营企业则通过“关系”来影响审计行为，这丰富了目前已有政治关联对审计师行为影响的文献。The motives for political connections differ between private and state-owned listed firms. In general, the political connections of state-owned enterprises （SOEs） are usually passive, while those of private firms are much more voluntary. Wang et al. （2008） find that the auditor choice and auditor independence of local SOEs have prominent characteristics; for example, local SOEs are more likely to hire small local auditors and have incentives to collude with them. Their argument is that local governments can use political pressure to affect the opinions and independence of auditors. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how political connections influence the auditor choice of private firms and auditor independence. Using a sample of A-share private listed firms from 2004 to 2009 in China, and analysing the motives for political connections in private listed firms, we find that politically connected private firms lack sufficient incentives to choose big auditors, preferring to employ small local auditors instead. The empirical results also show that political connections can lower auditor independence, that is, weaken the positive relation between audit opinions and earnings management. This means that politically connected private firms are more likely to receive clean opinions under the same level of earnings management. We further show that lower auditor independence is observed mainly among small auditors and small local auditors, while big auditors are much more independent. Our tests suggest that although the choice of auditor by SOEs and auditor independence are affected by government intervention, auditor behaviour is influenced by guanxi in private firms. Our paper thus enriches the literature on political connections and auditor behaviour.

关 键 词：民营上市公司 政治关联 审计师选择 审计师独立性 

分 类 号：F239.0[经济管理—会计学] F234.4[经济管理—国民经济]