隐性激励机制与管理者行为:基于SEM模型的实证分析  

Recessive Incentive Mechanism and Behavior of Administrators:Based Empirical Study of SEM Model

作　　者：宋言东[1] 

机构地区：[1]徐州工程学院管理学院,江苏徐州221008

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2011年第8期92-100,122,共10页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目(07SJD630071)

摘　　要：在实地调研的基础上,运用结构方程(SEM)模型研究了隐性激励机制对企业管理者行为产生影响的主要因素和路径。研究结果表明,在公司治理机制中,职位晋升、成就动机和控制权收益是影响管理者行为的几个重要因素,而人才市场的职业声誉对管理者行为没有显著影响。On the basis of spot research, the paper uses SEM model to study the principal elements and main ways that recessive incentive mechanism have an affect on the behavior of enterprise administrators. The results indicate that in corporate governance the elevation of position, achievement motivation and right of control are the principal elements that influence the behavior of enter prise administrators, but career reputation of the personnel market has no noticeable effect.

关 键 词：隐性激励机制 管理者行为 实证研究 

分 类 号：F240[经济管理—劳动经济]