利益与理念:宪政经济规范选择的正当性基础与启示  

Interests and Ideas: the Proper Foundation of Constitutional Economic Norm Choice and Its Revelation

作　　者：杨忠明[1] 刘焕桂[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学法学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《西南大学学报（社会科学版）》2011年第5期116-120,224,共5页Journal of Southwest University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目"宪政经济规范的基础研究"(07JA820042);项目负责人:石柏林

摘　　要：立宪意见的不一致既有可能源于立宪利益的不一致,也有可能源于立宪理念的不一致。如果规则选择上的分歧反映的是利益上的分歧,那么达成宪政同意显然就是一个妥协问题,但如果反映的是理念上的分歧,那么达成一致意见的过程显然涉及"真值判断"。布坎南与范伯格的这一深刻洞见对当下中国经济立宪具有重要启示,它不仅修正了我国长期以来对于宪政经济规范功用与目的的某些偏见,更为我国在社会转型时期的宪政变革与完善指明了可能路径。The variance of constitutional notion may come from disagreement of constitutional interests,or from the disagreement of constitutional theories.If the variance in rule choice reflect the difference of interests,reaching constitutional agreement is obviously a compromise problem.If it reflects the difference of theories,reaching constitutional agreement obviously relate to truth-judgment.Buchanan and Vanberg's profound theory has important revelation for Chinese economic constitutionality.It not only revises some prejudices to the function and purpose of constitutional economic norm in our country for a long time,but also indicates the possible path of constitutional reformation in our country's social transformation.

关 键 词：宪政经济规范 一致意见 立宪利益 立宪理念 

分 类 号：D911[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]